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ABSTRACT
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1 Introduction
Suppose we have some theory T and we wish to apply it to object 0 so as to predict
something about O. The theory might be Newtonian mechanics, the object a ball
suspended by a spring, and the aim to use Newtonian mechanics to predict the motion
of the ball. Or the theory might be the kinetic theory of gases, the object a salmple of
some gas, and the aim to use the former to predict the heat capacity of the latter. The
question I address in this paper is the following: does the application of Newtonian
mechanics (the kinetic theory of gases) to the suspended ball (a sample of some gas)
imply specific predictions about the ball's motion (the heat capacity of the gas)? This
question can be rephrased as follows. There are certain laws, principles, equations,
and so forth, which must be understood and accepted if one can be said to understand
and accept a theory. Let us call these basic assumptions the principles of the theory
or its theoretical principles. Newton's three laws of motion are obvious candidates
for theoretical principles of Newtonian mechanics. In addition, in accepting a theory
we often must also accept some mathematics, e.g., algebra, geometry, and vector
calculus. The question which will concern us can now be restated as follows: does the
application of the principles and mathematics of Newtonian mechanics (the kinetic
theory of gases) to a ball suspended by a spring (a sample of some gas) imply specific
predictions about the ball's motion (the heat capacity of the gas)?
According to Carl Ilempel (1966, pp. 72-75), the above question should be an-
swered with an affirmative. Hempel construes theories as consisting of two types of
principles, namely, bridge principles and internal principles.
Broadly speaking, the formulation of a theory will require the specifi-
cation of two kinds of principles; let us call them internal principles and
bridge principles for short. The former will characterize the basic entities
and processes invoked by the theory and the laws to which they are as-
sumed to conform. The latter will indicate how the processes envisaged
by the theory are related to empirical phenomena with which we are al-
ready acquainted, and which the theory may explain, predict, or retrodict.
(1966, pp. 72-73)
Theory application, on the other hand, is modeled in termus of three stages. In
the first stage a description of the object, expressed only in terms of a pretheoretical
vocabulary, is converted into a description using theoretical terms. Pretheoretical
terms, or antecedently available terms, are "terms that have been introduced prior
to the theory and can be used independently of it" (1966, p. 75). One advantage of
assuming a pretheoretical vocabulary is that it avoids the problematic assumption of
an observational vocabulary. A second advantage is that a pretheoretical description
provides a starting point from which theory application in its entirety can be traced
since, by definition, these descriptions can be arrived at and understood without using
the theory. In the first stage of theory application, a theoretical description is deduced
from a pretheoretical description through the use of the theory's bridge principles.
In the second stage the internal principles of the theory are used to predict what
happens to an object falling under the theoretical description inferred in the first
stage. And finally, in the third stage bridge principles are used again so as to connect
these predictions wi'h predictions stated in terms of the pretheoretical vocabulary.
A schematic illustration of Hempel's model of theory application is as follows (BP
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SBPpretheoretical description -L theoretical description
IPtheoretical description -, predicted theoretical description (1)
BPpredicted theoretical description -L predicted pretheoretical description
indicates a set of bridge principles and IP indicates a set. of internal principles):
Hempel answers the questions stated above with an affirmative because, according
to the above model of theory application, predictions about objects are deduced from
the application of theoretical principles to these objects. For example, predictions
about the motion of a ball suspended by a spring (the heat capacity of a sample of gas)
would be deduced from the application of the bridge principles and internal principles
of Newtonian mechanics (the kinetic theory of gases) to a pretheoretical description of
the ball and spring (the sample of gas). What could be wrong with these conclusions?
One obvious answer to this question is that theories simply do not provide enough
theoretical principles to accommodate Hempel's view. For example, a theory might
not supply the bridge principles needed to link a pretheoretical description of some
object with a theoretical description which is sufficiently detailed to yield the desired
prediction. This does not, however, imply that the theory cannot be used to make such
predictions; rather, predictions might be obtained by supplementing the principles
of the theory with assumptions which do not qualify as principles of the theory.
This type of argument is developed after considering the "sample of gas" example in
the second section. The first section provides a discussion of an example of theory
application which does fit Hempel's model (the "ball and spring" example).
In the third section Nancy Cartwright's (1980) criticism of Hempel's model is
considered. Cartwright criticizes Hempel's construal of theory appliction by arguing
that very often there is a gap in the alleged chain of deductive inferences characterized
by Hempel. I share this view but disagree with Cartwrighlt about the location of the
gap. Cartwright misdiagnoses the problem with Hempel's view. She argues that a
theory provides few bridge principles for linking theoretical descriptions with the sorts
of descriptions to which the "theory can match an equation". In terms of Hempel's
picture she therefore locates the gap somewhere in the second stage. On the basis of
the "sample of gas example", I argue that the gap occurs in the first stage, that is,
in between the initial pretheoretical description and the theoretical description. The
existence of this gap is attributed to the absence of bridge principles. Gaps might
exist in other places as well but I argue that Cartwright finds a gap where there is
none. And finally, the last section provides a rimnimary of the basic conclusions of the
paper.
2 Principle Governed Theory Application
In this section Newtonian mechanics is applied to a ball suspended by a spring.
The question which concerns us here is whether the application of the principles and
mathematics of Newtonian mechanics to the ball and spring imply a prediction about,
for example, the location of the ball in five seconds. In order to simplify the example,
we shall assume that there are no frictional forces acting on the ball or spring-this
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makes the example somewhat artificial but nonetheless I will argue that the example
serves to illustrate an instance of theory application which fits Hempel's model. In
order to capture the complete course of theory application the starting point, must
be a description of the ball and spring stated in terms of a pretheoretical vocabulary.
The general plan is to begin with a pretheoretical description of the object, apply the
theory to this description, and derive a prediction about the motion of the ball.
A ball is attached to a spring. The ball is for the most part spherical and about
the size of a marble. It is connected to a spring made of some type of wire which is
wound into a helical shape. The helix has a certain length and a certain diameter
and the wire has a certain thickness. The spring hangs vertically from a ceiling beam
and the ball hangs at the bottom of the spring. We observe that if we take hold of
the ball, move it downwards and release it, then the ball moves up and down. We can
also measure the ball's position at various times and plot its position as a function of
time.
All of the terms used in the above description can be understood independently
of Newtonian mechanics. But the description is only a partial description and the
extent to which certain features of the objects are described whereas others are not
might be indicative of some underlying understanding of Newtonian mechanics. The
description's focus on the kinematic and geometric features of the objects, as opposed
to, for instance, their colors, might be due to the describer's awareness that geometric
features as opposed to colors enter into a Newtonian account of the motion of the ball.
Therefore, if our aim is to illustrate the complete process of theory application, it is
better to add to the above description everything else one knows about the objects
which does not presuppose any knowledge of Newtonian mechanics.
Before applying Newtonian mechanics to the ball and spring as described above it
is necessary to introduce an assumption about the composition of Newtonian mechan-
ics. Like Hempel, I assume that Newtonian mechanics consists of a set of theoretical
principles which are interpreted in standard ways. These principles include Newton's
laws of motion, the principles of conservation of mnomentunm and energy, and New-
ton's law of gravitation. There are other principles as well but what is characteristic
of all of the principles of a theory is that in accepting the theory one must accept
them. This assumption is supported by the fact that textbooks always introduce
these principles as central to the theory and by the fact that advocates of the theory
apply these principles without the need for any special justification. The question
before us can now be phrased as whether the application of these principles and the
theory's mathematics to the pretheoretical description of the ball and spring imply a
prediction about the ball's location at future times.
Theory application might take the following course. First, the theory informs us
that the ball has some quantity of mass. Here we rely on a theoretical principle of
Newtonian mechanics, often left unstated, which asserts that all bodies have some
quantity of mass. The quantity of mass of the ball can be measured with a pan
balance. The mass is determined by placing the ball on one arm of the balance
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and placing masses of known magnitude on the other arm until the two arms are
balanced. Next, given that the motion of the ball is nonuniform, Newton's first law
implies that an unbalanced force acts on the ball, i.e., every material body persists
in its state of rest or of uniform, unaccelerated motion in a straight line, unless it is
compelled to change that state by the application of an external, unbalanced force.
This raises the question of what is the magnitude and direction of the force which
acts on the ball. Suppose one takes the ball in his hand and moves it towards the
spring so as to compress the spring. In that case, he feels a force exerted by the
spring against his hand. Similarly, if one moves the ball so as to stretch the spring he
feels a force pulling his hand towards the spring. Pushes and pulls like these provide
some of the criteria for identifying forces. Understanding the Newtonian concept of
'force' assumes, among other things, an understanding of these criteria for identifying
the presence of forces. Finally, the magnitude of the force due to the spring can be
determined by suspending the spring from a beam and attaching various weights of
known magnitude to the end of the spring. The magnitude of these weights versus
the distance they displace the spring from its relaxed position can then be plotted.
The resulting plot provides a graph of f(x), that is, the magnitude of the force exerted
by the spring on a body attached to it when the spring is displaced from its relaxed
position by a distance x. Furthermore, suppose that over the range of x for whiclh f(x)
is measured that f(x) fits the line f(x) = -kx, where k is 160; better yet, suppose
that as far as the eye can discern the measured values of f(x) exactly fits the line
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f(x) = -kx.
There are several gaps in the above reasoning, that is, places in which conclusions
are reached which are not apparently the result of applying theoretical principles to
the pretheoretical description. Why, for instance, does the pan balance provide a
measure of mass? To see why it does we would need to consider the application
of additional theoretical principles to the pan balance, e.g., Newton's second law of
motion and the law of gravitation. Similarly, the method for measuring the spring
constant assumes some additional theoretical principles such as Newton's third law.
But for present purposes it is not necessary to show how every step in the derivation is
warranted by principles of Newtonian mechanics. Instead, it is sufficient to point out
that masses and forces are measured this way and that, if one understands and accepts
Newtonian mechanics, he or she must accept the results of such measurements. We
cannot understand and accept Newtonian mechanics and still doubt that the values
for m and f(x) as determined above are the correct values. If one consults any textbook
on Newtonian mechanics or any authority on the subject, applies what he learns to
the ball and spring as described, and still denies the assumed values for m and f(x),
then he has not yet learned Newtonian mechanics. Without filling in the necessary
steps and digressing further into elementary Newtonian mechanics, we may safely
conclude that the following theoretical description of the ball can be deduced from
the application of theoretical principles to the assumed pretheoretical description:
A mass of 10 grams is acted upon by a force -kh where k is 160 and
x is the displacement of the ball front its equilibrium position.
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If we accept the above conclusions, as I think we must, then this example con-
firms Hempel's view of the first stage of theory application. Recall that according to
Hempel theory application begins with a description of an object stated in terms of
a pretheoretical vocabulary. In the first stage of theory application bridge principles
are applied to this description and a description of the object in terms of the theo-
retical vocabulary is deduced, i.e., the above theoretical description. This description
is deduced because, if we premise the pretheoretical description and Newtonian me-
chanics, the theoretical description can only be denied at the price of inconsistency,
i.e., denying at least one of the premises. Newtonian mechanics therefore provides
a set of bridge principles which enable us to deduce the above theoretical descrip-
tion from the pretheoretical description. For example, Newton's first law of motion
functions as a bridge principle when it is used to infer the presence of an unbalanced
force from a description of a nonuniform motion. And in less obvious ways, additional
principles of Newtonian mechanics, as interpreted in standard ways, are used to infer
the remainder of the theoretical description from the pretheoretical description.
According to Hempel, in the second stage of theory application internal princi-
ples of the theory are used to predict what happens to an object falling under the
theoretical description deduced in the first stage. In the second stage, Newton's sec-
ond law of motion functions as an internal principle since it can be used to predict
what happens to an object falling under the above theoretical description. Newton's
second law states that the net unbalanced force acting on a body is proportional to
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the product of its acceleration and mass; therefore, it follows that ma = -kx. As-
suming some initial conditions (that the ball is released from rest at a point 5 cm
from its equilibrium position) and some of the mathematics assumed by Newtonian
mechanics, the following equation of motion is derived:
d2x
m = -kx (2)dtr
The general solution to this equation of motion is:
x(t) = A cos(wt + q) (3)
where w = k/rn and 4 is the phase factor. Since m = 10 grains and k = 160, w = 4
radians/second. And finally, application of the initial conditions (at t = 0 . = 5 cm
and v = 0) implies that A = 5 cm and b = 0. The final solution to the equation of
motion is therefore:
Z(t) = 5 cos(4t) (4)
In the final stage of Hempel's picture of theory application bridge principles are used
again so as to infer a prediction about the ball, stated in terms of a pretheoretical
vocabulary, from the theoretical description of the object which was deduced with
internal principles. A bridge principle would link the predicted motion of the mass
with the predicted motion of the ball. Bridge principles like this one are often left
unstated in textbooks, but in order to show how the present example fits Hempel's
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view, they must be explicitly stated.
In summary, if we premise the assumed pretheoretical description of the ball and
spring and Ncwtonian mechanics we have no choice but to predict that the ball's
motion will be accurately described by figure 1. In this case, we are not free to argue
that, for instance, this is the motion of the ball predicted with Newtonian mechanics
by John Smith but Fred Brown has used the same theory to predict a different
motion. There are no choices here-if John and Fred arrive at different predictions
then one of them has not correctly applied Newtonian mechanics to the pretheoretical
description. And finally, these facts have clear consequences for the related issue of
theory evaluation. If the ball's motion does not approximate the motion depicted in
figure 1 then, if we assume that the pretheoretical description is accurate, then the
theory is in trouble, i.e., at least one of its theoretical principles must be modified
or rejected. The blame cannot be placed elsewhere as it might be if we could argue
that there are other ways of applying the theory which might accurately predict the
motion.
3 When Bridge Principles are Lacking
In this section I develop an example of theory application which does not support
Hempel's view. In this example the kinetic theory of heat is applied to a sample of
some gas so as to derive the heat capacity of the gas. What distinguishes this example
from the "ball and spring" example is that the application of the principles of the
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Figure 1: Theoretically predicted motion of ball.
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kinetic theory of heat to the gas does not result in a theoretical description which is
sufficiently detailed to yield a prediction about the heat capacity of the gas. But of
course, this theory was used to make predictions about the heat capacities of various
gases; therefore, theory application involves something besides applying theoretical
principles. The additional component consists of hypotheses which are not mandated
by the application of any of the theory's principles. In this example, these hypotheses
consist of conjectures about the molecular structure of the gas, and because different
advocates of the theory may favor different hypotheses, the theory can be used to
make several conflicting predictions about the heat capacity of the gas. The "right"
hypothesis is not determined by theoretical principles, rather, it is determined with
the hindsight gained from comparing predictions based on alternative hypotheses with
observation.
As was the case with Newtonian mechanics, the kinetic theory of heat is assumed
to povide several theoretical principles. These principles include Newton's laws of
motion, the principles of conservation of energy and momentum, and Newton's law
of gravitation. In addition, the theory assumes certain bridge principles such as that
asserting that the temperature of a gas is proportional to the mean kinetic energy
of its molecules. Another principle of the theory is the principle of equiparition of
energy. This principle states that for a substance in thermal equilibrium its energy
is equally divided between the degrees of freedom of its molecules, that is, its energy
is equally divided between the translational, rotational, and vibrational degrees of
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freedom of is molecules. Some advocates of the theory questioned this principle, such
as Maxwell, but for present purposes I will treat it as a principle of the theory. And
finally, the theory provides several definitions which pertain to heat capacities. The
heat capacity C, or specific heat, of a substance is defined as the amount of heat
required to raise a mole of the substance by one degree of temperture. Expressed
differently, the heat capacity is the capacity of a body to absorb heat for a given rise
in temperture. Two types of heat capacity are distinguished. C,( is the heat required
to raise the temperture of some amount of a mole of a substance by one degree when
the volume is held constant. In this sense, C, is said to measure the true heat capacity
because when the volume is held constant no work is done. C,, is defined as
C,,= OE/OT (5)
where E is the heat energy used to raise the temperture T. On the other hand, Cp
represents the heat required to raise the temperture of a mole of substance one degree
with the pressure is held constant:
CI = C, + R (6)
where R is the gas constant. From these two equations it follows that:
" = c,/Co = 1 + R/C, (7)
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Therefore, once C, is known, equations 6 and 7 can be used to infer (¾, and y. Since
C,, = 9E/OT, determining C,, requires knowing E(T), that is, the dependence of the
energy per mole of gas on T. In order to determine E(T) one additional result will
be assumed. Advocates of the kinetic theory of heat determined that a mole of gas
has RT/2 units of energy per degree of molecular freedom.
The above assumptions consist of theoretical principles, definitions, and some
"results" which do not fit in either category. Whether or not all of these assumptions
are essential to the kinetic theory of heat is open to dispute, but let us give Hempel
the benefit oi the doubt, and simply assume that the theory includes all of these
assumptions and that they are all similar to theoretical principles in that accepting
the theory presupposes the acceptance of them. Given these assumptions, the problem
of determining C,, for a gas is greatly simplified. Since the total energy E per mole
of a gas is the sum of the energies per degree of freedom of translation, rotation, and
vibration, and each of these degrees contributes RT/2 energy, it follows that:
E = (t + r + 2v)RT/2 (8)
where t, r, and v represent the number of translational, rotational and vibrational
degrees of freedom and the factor of 2 before v is attributed to the fact that vibra-
tional energy consists of both kinetic and potental energy, whereas translational and
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rotational energy are purely kinetic. And finally, since C , = E/OT,
C, = (t + r + 2v)T/2 (9)
To further simplify the problem of evaluating Hempel's view, suppose we now
simply assume that equation 9 is one of the internal principles of the kinetic theory of
heat; hence, we can forget about its derivation and simply assume it as fundamental.
Ilempel's view will therefore be vindicated if the theory also provides bridge principles
which connect pretheoretical descriptions of gacLs with theoretical descriptions of the
degrees of freedom of their molecules.
In order to appraise Hempel's view let us assuhie that a group of advocates of the
kinetic theory of gases is confronted with a sample of gas and asked to use the theory
to predict its heat capacity. The names of the hypothetical members of this group
are KrSnig, Clausius, Jeans, Rankine, and Maxwell.
Krbnig models (describes) the gas as consisting of N point-masses, where N is
Avagadro's number. Because point-masses only have translational motions, and there
are three degrees of translational freedom, E(T) = 3RT/2, and therefore, C, =
3R/2, and y7 is 12. The physicist KrSnig derived this result in the nineteeth century.
Following KrSnig, Clausius argues that molecules might have motions in addition to
that of translation, such as rotational and vibrational motions. He reasons as follows:
KrSnig assumes that the molecules of a gas do not oscilliate about def-
inite positions of equilibrium, but that they move with constant velocity
in right lines until they strike against other molecules, or against some
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surface which is to them impermeable. I share this view completely, and
I also believe that the expansive force of the gas arises from this motion.
On the other hand, I am of the opinion that this is not the only motion
present . . . In the first place, the hypothesis of a rotary motion as well as
a progressive motion of the molecules at once suggests itself; for at every
impact of two bodies, unless the same happens to be central and rectilin-
ear, a rotary motion ensues ... I am also of the opinion that vibrations
take place within the several masses in a state of progressive mnotion. Such
vibrations are conceivable in several ways. (1857, p.109)
IrNt--
rigid diatomic vibrational diatomic
rigid, linear triatomic vibrational, linear triatomic
rigid, nonlinear triatomic vibrational, nonlinear triatomic
Figure 2: Illustration of several molecular models.
Some of the models suggested by Clausius are illustrated in figure 2. The C,
associated with each of these models can be derived by simply determnining the number
of translational, rotational, and vibrational degrees of freedom allowed by the model
and substituting these values into equation 9. The following table lists the names of
these models and the values of t, r, v, C~ and y associated with them.
Suppose that the measured value of 7 is 1.5. KrSnig predicts a value of 1.67 for 7
whereas Clausius uses a variety of models, the best of which predicts a value of 1.40
for 7. Because neither of these results agree with the measured result, Jeans considers
19
I
Model Type t r v C§, 7
point-mass 3 0 0 3R/2 5/3
rigid diatomic 3 2 0 5R/2 7/5
vibrational diatomic 3 2 1 7R/2 9/7
rigid, linear triatomic 3 2 0 5R/2 7/5
rigid, nonlinear triatomic 3 3 0 6R/2 8/6
vibrational, linear triatomic 3 2 4 13R/2 15/13
vibrational, nonlinear triatomic 3 3 3 12R/2 14/12
Figure 3: Summary of values of t, r, v, C, and y for several molecular models.
the implications of assuming that molecules can aggregate with one another, and after
some derivation, shows how molecular aggregation will enter into the determination
of C, Cp,, and hence 7:
For in raising the temperture of the gas work is done not only in
increasing the energy of the various molecules, but also in seperating a
number of molecules from one another's attractions. This work will involve
an addition to the values of CG and 0,, such as was not contemplated in the
earlier analysis... We should therefore expect the values of (V-, and C,; to
be in excess of the values obtained from our eariler formulae, throughout
regions of pressure and temperture in which molecular aggregation can
come into play. (1962, p.293)
But suppose Jeans reasoning cannot make the theory accommodate the measured
value of 7 since, as KrSnig and Clausius point out, the pressure and temperture of the
gas are not in regions in which molecular aggregation comes into play-the measured
7 therefore remains an anomaly for the theory. Rankine now takes up the challenge
and introduces a new type of model which might account for the measured 7. Rankine
considers a vortex model of the molecules which he describes as follows:
That each atom of matter consists of a nucleus, or central physical
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point, enveloped by an elastic atmosphere, which is retained in its position
by forces attractive towards the nucleus or centre.
That the elasticity due to heat arises froni the centrifugal force of rev-
olutions or oscillations among the particles of the atomic atmospheres; so
that the quantity of heat is the vis viva [kinetic energy] of those revolutions
or oscillations. (1851, p.234)
Rankine shows that the expressions for C, derived with this type of model take
the following form:
A, = OE/Ot = f(k) (10)
Here, Cq is expressed simply as a function of the coefficient k which Rankine uses
to represent the ratio of the kinetic energy due to the vortical motion of an elastic
atmosphere to the total energy of an atom (which also includes the kinetic energy of
its nucleus, and possibly, the energy due to "oscillations of expansion and contraction,
or of rectilinear vibration about a position of equilibrium" (1851, p. 240). Different
values for k, and hence for C, and 7 can be inferred from different vortex models.
But suppose that after imagining a variety of vortex models, Rankine is not able to
find one which leads to a value of y equal to 1.5.
Finally, Maxwell steps forward and shows how the theory can be used to predict
a continuous range of values for 7 ranging from 1.3 to 1.6. lie obtains this result by
assuming that the gas might consist of various mixtures of spherical and non-spherical
particles:
By considering the effect of collisions of bodies of any form not spher-
ical it appears that the vis viva of rotation tends to become equal to thlat
of translation so that the whole energy in unit of volume is not pv 2 /2 as
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in the case of perfect spheres, but pyt2 . In R medium of perfect spheres
and partly of other bodies the energy will be 13pv 2 /2 where
P-/ 2 + P2
PI +P2
(Pt being the weight of the spheres and p2 of the other bodies in unit of
volume) where q is the ratio of the mass of the non-spherical particles to
that of the whole mass. If y is the ratio of the specific heat under constant
pressure to that under constant volume
23/3
If the particles are all spherical with their centres of figure and mass
coincident than q = 0, l = 1, and 7= 1- l 1.6. If none of the particles
fulfill these conditions then q = 1,/3 = 2, and = 11 1.3. These are
the two extreme cases. (1986, p. 341)
Maxwell then concludes that the gas consists of a mixture of particles in which
the number of spherical particles is greater than the number of non-spherical particles
and shows how a value for 7 of 1.5 can be derived.
Before turning to the implications of this example it should be pointed out that
Krbnig, Clausius, Maxwell, Jeans, and Rankine accepted the kinetic theory of gases.
They all accepted Newton's laws of motion, the assumption that the mean kinetic
energy of a gas is proportional to its temperature, and various additional principles
of the kinetic theory. In addition, although the scenerio assumed in this example
is artificial, the above discussion accurately reflects the molecular models developed
by these individuals and the values of C, and 7 they derived with these models.
With these conclusions in mind let us now turn to the question of whether Hempel's
construal of theories and theory application fits this example.
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This example presents a problem for Hempel's view because of the absence of
bridge principles which connect a pretheoretical description of the gas with a de-
scription of its molecules. The theory does provide some bridge principles such as
the general principle which states that the temperature of a gas is proportional to
the mean kinetic energy of its molecules. But the application of these principles to
the gas does not produce a description of the molecules which is sufficiently detailed
to imply specific values for C,, and 7. On the other hand, one might argue that
Kr6nig, for example, introduced such a bridge principle which linked a pretheoretical
description of the gas with a detailed molecular model when he described the gas as
a collection of point-masses-but surely this is not a principle of the kinetic theory
since Clausius, Maxwell, Jeans, and Rankine might have modeled the gas differently
even though they were still applying the kinetic theory.
The "correct" model of the gas is not determined by the application of principles
to a pretheoretical description of the gas but by the conjectures of individuals and
trial and error methods. Krbnig modeled the gas as a collection of point-masses and
predicted a value of 1.67 for 7. Because the measured value of 7 is 1.5, Clausius,
Jeans, Rankine, and Maxwell put forth alternative hypotheses about the molecules
of the gas and derived different results for 7. If in the end we conclude that Maxwell
found the "correct" model then it is not because his description of the gas was dictated
by the application of principles of the theory but because his model predicts that 7
is 1.5. And here is where theory application involves not so much the application
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of theoretical principles as the imagination of its advocates. The role of imagination
becomes particular important when a theory is confronte d with an anomaly, for as this
example illustrates, the advocates of a theory often concoct a diverse group of models
in their attempts to find the "correct" model which makes the theory accommodate
the anomaly.
The present example, therefore, supports a view of theory application quite differ-
ent from that supported by the example of the previous section. The two examples
also corroborate sharply contrasting views of theory evaluation. In the discussion
of the last section I argued that everyone who understands and accepts Newtonian
mechanics, reasons correctly, and premises the assumed pretheoretical description of
the ball and stone must reach the same prediction about the ball's motion. The ap-
plication of the theory's principles did not leave room for choices which, for instance,
would allow John Smith and Fred Brown to make different predictions about the ball's
motion. On the other hand, on the basis of the example of this section I have argued
that the application of the principles of the kinetic theory to a gas requires that in-
dividual conjectures be made if our aim is to predict values for C,, and 7. Because of
the variety of possible conjectures, the theory can be used to predict many values for
C,, and -y. Two different views of theory evaluation emerge from these two examples.
If the motion of the ball does not agree with the motion predicted with Newtonian
mechanics then the theory is in trouble-one of its principles must be modified or
rejected. But if Krinig uses the kinetic theory to predict a value for 7 of 1.67 when
24
in fact y is 1.5 then it does not follow that one of the principles of the kinetic theory
must be rejected or modified. Rather, in cases like this one, the blame can be placed
on the individual as opposed to the theory. Krbinig failed to find a model which
would make the theory accommodate the phenomenon, but subsequently, Maxwell
vindicated the theory by showing how it could predict 1.5 for C,.
Similarly, these two examples argue for different conclusions about whether a
distinction between a "context of evaluation" and a "context of discovery" can be
maintained. In the case of the kinetic theory, theory evaluation and theory discovery
(articulation) occur simultaneously and in the same context. In order to evaluate the
kinetic theory in accordance with its agreement with measured values of C, and 7 it
is necessacy to imagine ways in which gases can be modeled. If none of these models
accounts for a given heat capacity then the process of evaluation is not complete since
new models might be discovered which accommodate the heat capacity. On the other
hand, if Newtonian mechanics does not correctly predict the ball's motion then the
theory is in trouble and we are not free to discover new ways of describing the ball
and spring since a unique theoretical description is deduced from the application of
the theory's principles. Therefore, in this case, theory evaluation occurs in a context
into which theory discovery does not enter.
The above discussion of the kinetic theory suggests a different picture of theories
and the way in which their empirical content is determined. IIempel's construal of
theories in terms of bridge principles and internal principles provides a simple answer
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to the question of how a theory is related to its empirical content, i.e., how it is related
to its testable predictions. The content of a theory can be deduced by applying its
bridge principles and internal principles to pretheoretical descriptions of the objects in
its domain. Whereas Hempel's picture provides a straightforward way of delineating
the content of a theory, the above discussion of the kinetic theory suggests that a
more complicated picture is needed. In order to address this issue let us assume that
every aspect of the above derivations of values for CW, fits Hempel's picture except for
those steps in which a molecular model was assumed. Given this assumption, the C,
content of the theory is fixed by the theoretical principles in conjunction with all of
the molecular models allowed by the theory. This suggests that the kinetic theory
be construed in terms of bridge principles, internal principles, some mathematics,
and models. The crucial question which must then be resolved in determining the
C, content of the theory is then-how is the class of models allowed by a theory
determined?
There is no clear-cut way of specifying the models of a theory, nonetheless, some
clarity can be gained by drawing attention to the following two points. First, models
used in one application are often borrowed from other applications. All of the mod-
els discussed in applying the kinetic theory of heat to a gas originated in applying
Newtonian mechanics to balls, springs, and similar objects. More generally, many of
the models used in applying the classical theories of heat, sound, and light originated
when applying Newtonian mechanics to objects within its domain. Second, these
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"borrowed" models also function as generative models because they are suggestive
of a cluster of models. Let us call the description of molecules in terms of balls and
springs a root model. The root model is a generative model because it suggests a
large group of models which are variations of it. These variations stem from choices
which result from thinking about the root model. Some of these choices pertain to
the mass, size, shape, and number of the "balls"; the length of the spring and its
spring constant; and the arrangement of the balls and springs (linear or nonlinear).
The above considerations place some constraints on the class of models which can
be used in applying the kinetic theory. These models must be based on models devel-
oped in applying Newtonian mechanics to its domain or they must be generated from
models developed in applying Newtonian mechanics, e.g., combinations or variations
of these models. These constraints might not be very satisfying since they leave us
with a "fuzzy" characterization of the kinetic theory and its empirical content. On
the other hand, a more rigid characterization may result in a misunderstanding of
the kinetic theory and its empirical content.
4 Cartwright's Criticism of Hempel's View
Nancy Cartwright (1980) has also criticized Hempel's construal of theory application,
although, her objection is quite different from the objection raised in the previous sec-
tion. These two types of objections are similar because, stated too generally, they
both assert that there is often a gap in the alleged Ilempelian chain of deductions
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which occurs before a prediction is reached. But these two forms of criticism differ
when it comes to locating the gap. I have argued that theories often do not provide
the bridge principles needed to connect a pretheoretical with a sufficiently detailed
theoretical description. To remedy this problem, the principles of the theory are sup-
plemented with hypotheses authored by individuals. This type of reasoning places the
gap somewhere in the first stage of the Hempelian model of theory application-in
between the pretheoretical description and a sufficiently detailed theoretical descrip-
tion. On the other hand, Cartwright's construal of theory application overlooks the
first stage and simply starts with a theoretical description. She then locates a gap
somewhere in the second stage by arguing that a theory provides very few principles
for converting a theoretical description into a description to which the "theory can
match an equation". In general, I will argue that Cartwright overlooks the stage of
theory application in which gaps occur and argues that there is a gap where there is
none.
Cartwright describes theory application as having two endpoints, namely, theory
entry and theory exit. Theory exit is what happens at the end of theory applica-
tion when we "exit" the theory and conclude with a prediction. The problem with
Cartwright's view which is alluded to above, however, arises in her account of theory
entry:
...I think theory entry proceeds in two stages. We start with an
unprepared description which gives as accurate a report as possible of the
situation. The first stage converts this into a prepared description. (1980,
p. 15)
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We shall shortly see what a prepared description is; for now it is only important
to note that her first stage of theory entry starts with an unprepared description. But
now notice what she allows as an unprepared description:
Theory entry proceeds in two stages. I imagine that we begin by
writing down everything we know about the system under study, a gross
exaggeration, but one which will help to make the point. This is the
unprepared description ... The unprepared description contains any infor-
mation we think relevant, in whatever form we have available. There is
no theory-observation distinction here. We write down whatever informa-
tion we have: we may know that the electrons in the beani are all spin
up because we have been at pains to prepare them that way . . . and we
may also know that that the cavity [of a helium-neon laser] is filled with
three-level helium atoms. The unprepared description may well use the
language and the concepts of the theory, but it is not constrained by any
of the mathematical needs of the theory. (1980, p. 133)
The above unprepared description of the laser describes the laser cavity as con-
taining three-level atoms, i.e., atoms which have three energy levels. On the other
hand, the theory which Cartwright applies to the laser is quantum theory (1980, p.
132), But Cartwright's account of theory entry starts with an unprepared descrip-
tion. One might therefore argue that Cartwright overlooks the first stage of theory
application since her account starts with descriptions which presuppose some previ-
ous theory application-quantum theory was used in inferring that the laser cavity
contains three-level atoms. But Cartwright would deny this and argue that the rea-
soning which implies that there are three-level atoms in the cavity does not assume the
quantum theory. This conclusion is supported by Cartwright's realism about causal
entities and anti-realism about theories. She believes in electrons and atoms but she
denies that our theories about electrons and atoms are true; hence, there must be a
29
way of ascertaining their existence which does not preimise somne theory about them.
Cartwright argues that causal strategies provide the answer. By manipulating a cause
(an electron) and checking to see if its effects change in the appropriate imanner the
nature of the causal entity (the electron) can be determnined. This is done through
experimentation and "intervention" and in such a way that no theory about electrons
is presupposed-it is not the Bohr electron, the Rutherford electron, or the Lorenz
electron, rather, "it is the electron, about which we have a number of incomplete and
sometimes conflicting theories" (1980, p. 92).
The manipulation of causal entities is one method which informs our understand-
ing of the microscopic world, but I have also emphasized the way in which theories
are used to make inferences about electrons. Inferences about electrons are made in a
way similar to the way in which the hypothetical Maxwell of the last section inferred
that the sample of gas consisted of a mixture of spherical and non-spherical particles.
In this case, the kinetic theory was presupposed in making this inference. This type of
inference is called "inference to the best explanation" as opposed to "inference to the
most probable cause" as characterized by Cartwright. I doubt that these two types of
inference come apart as easily as Cartwright suggests, but without further digression,
let us gather what is needed from these considerations and return to the main line
of argument. Suppose that Cartwright is right and that just as experimentation and
intervention implied that the laser cavity consists of three-level atoms it now implies
that the gas consists of nonlinear triatomic molecules.
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Theory entry therefore simply begins with an unprepared description which de-
scribes the molecules of the gas. In this way, Cartwright circumvents those steps in
theory application for which I argued that Heumpel's view runs into problems. Where
then does Hempel's view go wrong according to Cartwright? The problem Cartwright
points to is reflected by her use of the phrases unprepared dcscription and prepared
description. Why does Cartwright call certain descriptions unprepared description,
or expressed differently, what are these descriptions not prepared for? According to
Cartwright, they are not prepared for the "mathematical needs of the theory":
At the first stage of theory entry we prepare the description: we present
the phenomenon in a way that will bring it into the theory. The most
apparent need is to write down a description to which the theory matches
an equation. (1980, p. 133)
The unprepared description must be converted into a prepared description because
of the limited number of descriptions to which a theory can match an equation. In
support of this argument we might appeal to textbooks oIt Newtonian and quantum
mechanics. In the first case, we find a limited number of equations for representing
balls attached to springs-there are the standard equations for the simple harmonic
oscillator, the damped oscillator (with underdamping, critical damping, and over-
damping), the driven oscillator, the damped and driven oscillator, and so forth. In
the case of quantum mechanics Cartwright appeals to textbooks and cites a handful
of what she calls "model Hamiltonians" which include the linear harmonic oscillator,
the free particle in one dimension, the particle in a box, all of which, are associated
with a Hamiltonian which when substituted into Schrbdinger's equation gives the al-
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lowed energy levels for that model (1980, pp. 136-137). These models are examples of
Cartwright's prepared descriptions, that is, descriptions to which the theory matches
an equation. But nature is messy and coniplicated and the descriptions which accu-
rately describe it are rarely prepared descriptions: "I claim that in general we will
have to distort the true picture of what happens if we want to fit it into the highly
constrained structures of our mathematical theories" (1980 p. 139). And finally, this
presents a problem for Hempel's view because a theory provides very few principles
for going from a unprepared description to a prepared description: "there are few
formal principles for getting from 'true descriptions' to the kind that entails an equa-
tion. There are just rules of thumb, good sense, and, ultimately, the requirement that
the equation we end up with must do the job" (1980, p. 133).
This first stage of theory entry is informal. There may be better or
worse attempts, and a good deal of practical wisdom helps, but no prin-
ciples of the theory tell us how to prepare the description. We do not
look to a bridge principle to tell us what is the right way to take the facts
from our antecedent, unprepared description, and to express them in a
way that will meet the mathematical needs of the theory. The check on
correctness at this stage is not how well we have represented in the theory
the facts we know outside the theory, but only how successful the ultimate
mathematical treatment will be. (1980, p. 134)
So as to evaluate Cartwright's argument, consider the claim that prepared de-
scriptions are required because of the mathenatical needs of the theory. Cartwright
argues that a theory only attaches equations to a limited number of descriptions. She
gives the example of quantum theory and the limited number of Hamiltonians one
finds in a textbook on the theory. Similarly, in textbooks on Newtonian mechanics
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one finds only a handful of equations of motion for balls attached to springs. Students
are taught to somehow describe the situations characterized in their problem sets in
a way that leads to one of these stock equations. The result mllight be a distorted
description of the situation but it has the virtue of leading to equations that they
have learned how to solve. But the limited number of "stock" equations provided by
standard textbooks reflects a pedagogicai strategy and not a limitation of the theory.
A theory can match equations to a vast number of theoretical descriptions. Sup-
pose, for example, that theory entry begins with a very complicated unprepared
description of the molecules of a gas. The molecules are triatomic; the interatomic
forces within a molecule are complex damping and restoring forces; and the inter-
molecular forces vary as a complicated function of the intermolecular spacing. If all
of these parameters are known then we can in principle determine the equation of
motion of each atom. The equation would be extremely complicated, but nonetheless,
the theory does associate an equation of motion with each atom; therefore, the as-
sumption of a prepared description which idealizes or in some other way misrepresents
the atoms is not necessary.
On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that all of the atomic parameters would
be known. If the kinetic theory is used in an attempt to fill in these details then,
as I have argued in the last section, we find that it does not provide the needed
bridge principles. The resulting gap must be filled with conjectures which are not
implied by the theory. So there might be a gap here, but it is not the one argued
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for by Cartwright. According to Cartwright these parameters are not determined
through theory application. They are not determined through "inference to the best
explanation", i.e., by inferring the "correct" niodel from its role in accounting for the
heat capacity, viscosity, etc., of the gas. Rather, if these parameters are unknown
they will be determined with experimentation and causal reasoning all of which takes
place outside of the context of Cartwright's construal of theory entry; hence, any gaps
or missing details which arise here are not reflective of theory entry.
In order to determine whether theory entry consists of a gap-free series of de-
ductions we should therefore start with a description which completely characterizes
the molecules of the gas. This assumption enables us to focus on Cartwright's thesis,
namely, that a theory provides few principles for converting such descriptions into the
sorts of descriptions to which the theory matches an equation. But if the masses of
the atoms, their interatomic forces, and so forth, are fully specified then, in principle,
the relevant equations can be determined. One possible explanation of Cartwright's
thesis is that she erroneously characterizes problems which arise outside of the context
of her construal of theory entry as problems which arise because of the "mathematical
needs of the theory". If a description of an object is sufficiently detailed, stated with
the terms of the theory, then in principle the relevant equations can be determined.
On the other hand, if these details are lacking, or if the description is not cast in the
vocabulary of the theory, then we will certainly have problems in determining the rele-
vant equations. But determining a sufficiently detailed description which is expressed
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with the concepts of the theory takes place outside of the context of Cartwright's
construal of theory entry.
5 Conclusions
In summary, I have arg-,ed that the "ball and spring" example and the "sample of
gas" example support different vit:ws of theory application. The first example was
argued to fit Hempel's model of theory application since predictions about the ball's
motion were deduced from a pretheoretical description of the ball and spring. Theory
application left no room for choices which would enable practitioners of the theory to
reach different predictions about the ball's motion. The second example supports a
different view since the application of the principles of the kinetic theory did not imply
a description of the gas which was sufficiently detailed to imply values for C, and 7.
Predictions of C, and 7 were only obtained through the additional use of conjectures
about the molecular composition of the gas which were not implied by any of the
theory's principles. Because individuals could advocate conflicting hypotheses about
the molecualr composition of the gas while still remaining committed to the same
theory, the kinetic theory was used to make a variety of conflicting predictions about
the heat capacity of the gas.
The relation between Newtonian mechanics and what it predicts about the motion
of the ball could therefore be specified with a Hempelian model. But the relation
between the kinetic theory and its C', content was not so easily specified. The theory
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was construed in terms of theoretical principles and root models which function as
generative models. The root models generate a "fuzzy" class of mnodels, and since
these models typically lead to different values for C, the (, content of the theory
was loosely characterized.
Similarly, these two examples were argued to support two different views of theory
evaluation. If the ball's motion does not agree with the motion indicated in figure 1
then the theory is in trouble-the theory cannot be defended on the grounds that this
is just one of many predictions about the ball's motion which can be implied with the
theory. The application of the theory to the pretheoretical description left no room
for such choices. But when Krbnig used the kinetic theory to predict a value for 7
of 1.67 when in fact -y is 1.5 it did not follow that one of the principles of the theory
must be rejected or modified. Rather, the example only showed that Krinig failed to
find the right way of applying the theory to the gas.
And finally, I argued that Cartwright misdiagnoses the problem with Hempel's
construal of theory application. Cartwright's argument was described as resting on
the assumption that a theory provides very few principles for converting a description
into a description to which the "theory can match an equation". But I argued that
if a description is sufficiently detailed and expressed in terms of the theory then in
principle we can determine the relevant equations. Both of these conditions might
not be satisfied, but because the place in which they might be satisfied lies outside of
the context of Cartwright's construal of theory application, whether or not they are
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in fact satisfied has no bearing on her view of theory application.
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